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1. Whereabouts of the problem
（1） Preface
The purpose of this article is the following three. Firstly, it is to examine the form of the 
international system and the logical relevance with supply and demand relations of the 
international public goods. Secondly, it is to make the model with “Cournot Equilibrium”. 
Thirdly, with this model, it is to interpret international political theory of the neo-realism.1）
There is two following recognition in the background of such a critical mind. Mechanism 
of supply and demand relations of the international public goods to produce the changes of 
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the international system have close connection, and the balance is recognition to have 
possibilities to stabilize an international system.　At first, this article models supply and 
demand structure of the international public goods in “Uni-Polar System”. And then, this 
thesis models supply and demand relations of the international public goods in “Bi-Polar 
System”.2）
In addition, an argument of this thesis is analysis for a short term as a general rule. And, 
this article does not discuss a supply standard of the most suitable international public goods 
（an argument of so-called “Pareto Efficiency”）. By the way, the supply activity of the 
international public goods in international relations is Non-Cooperative Game and 
Simultaneous Game. Therefore, the balance level strategic ideally is Nash Solution, and it is 
not Stackelberg Equilibrium. And, it is very likely that the supply and demand-related 
strategic variable of the international public goods in international relations becomes the 
supply amount of production, and many nations which are the demand subject are weak 
bodies relative to the large country which is the supply subject. Therefore, the balance level 
strategic ideally is not Bertrand Equilibrium.3）
（2） An analytical framework
At first, this thesis defines the concept of eight follows as follows to make an argument 
of this report clear.
（a） The dynamics and the stability of international system.
The international society is constructed by a large number of nations and it is social 
system performing a change by foreign policy and called this with International System.
（b） International public goods
In international relations, It called a fortune or service having both character of Non-
Exclusiveness and Non-Rivalness international public goods.4） Generally speaking, resources 
for the international order that a hegemony country having the preeminence of the resources 
occupation power such as military affairs, economy, politics, culture, energy, the food supplies 
for other countries in comparison with other countries are international public goods. A 
global environment, world peace, a fair trade relationship, the international transportation 
network are international public goods to be concrete. Because as for the goods and the 
service that the advantage is enjoyed by the whole world or plural countries is because is it. 
Therefore, the international public goods are not only simple material or human resources. 
The frame of the system of international law, international organization, development policy, 
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financial support, trade relationship, international security, Regime of the international 
collaboration are included in international public goods.5）
（c） Supply of the international public goods
Because so-called “equilateral externality” （plus externality） beyond the profit of the 
specific supply country is big, the international public goods is easy to be undersupplied when 
I can leave it to a market system.6）  In addition, the country having the strong strength of a 
nation that can supply international public goods is limited. Therefore, the supply activity by 
the large country having intention and ability for the supply is necessary. In addition, a 
supply country decides the international public goods supply and quantity of request of the 
loyalty degree （later description）. It is equivalent to Products of the international public 
goods if it says economically.
（d） Demand of the international public goods
It called the degree that a demand for international public goods country supports a 
supply country by a foreign policy Degree of Loyalty. If it says economically, it is Price which 
is necessary to get 1 international public goods unit. Based on the request of the demand 
country, the large country which can supply international public goods is decided whether I 
can get the support of many countries, and the supply country calls for how much loyalty 
degree again.
（e） Uni-polar system
The international system that international public goods are supplied by a single 
superpower is called a monopole system. If this is the same as the hegemony system, and it is 
said economically at the same time if it says for international political science, this is the 
same as Monopoly Market.
（f） Bi-polar system
It called the international system that two superpowers supply international public goods 
Bi-polar system. If this is the same as Cold War System, and it is said economically again if it 
says for international political science, this is a kind of Oligopoly Market and it is the same as 
Duopoly Market.
Similarly, it sets three following suppositions.
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（ i ） The international system is constructed by two kinds of countries, and primarily it is the 
large country where it is single or few having ability to supply the other countries with 
international public goods, and second it is a lot of countries which cannot produce 
international public goods.
（ii） The demand for international public goods country shows a loyalty degree through the 
foreign policy depending on a supply for a supply country. The demand country acts to get 
maximum international public goods at a minimum loyalty degree. In addition, the supply 
country decides a supply of the international public goods depending on a loyalty degree of 
the demand country. The supply country acts to get a maximum loyalty degree with a 
minimum supply.
（iii） When supply and demand relations of the international public goods are balanced, the 
international system is stable and becomes unstable if it becomes unequal.
2. A Dynamics and the stability of the Uni-polar system
It is the international relations by so-called hegemon, and, in other words, the Uni-polar 
system is the hegemony system. Here, the international public goods is supplied by a single 
superpower. In addition, in the other countries, it is supplied international public goods by the 
superpower, and the demand country gives the hegemon concerned the support in the 
foreign policy instead and shows loyalty.
Therefore, the superpower supplies international public goods until a loyalty degree of 
the other countries which are profit of the self becomes greatest. Therefore, the point where 
supply accords with demand becomes the degree of the most suitable loyalty （it is a balance 
level in the monopoly market if it says by a term of the microeconomics）.
In addition, judging from a viewpoint of the international political theory, It can classify 
these in kind of the argument of neo-realism or International Political Economy. It falls under 
Hegemonic Stability Theory represented by Robert Gilpin; 7）.
（1） The formulation by the mathematics model
This thesis formulates the above-mentioned logic to expect accuracy. It transcribes a 
supply of the international public goods into S, a loyalty degree of a necessary demand 
country into L to get 1 international public goods unit, a total cost into C, gross earnings into 
R, a profit into I, therefore, it gets the following function and inverse function.
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S＝S （L）
L＝L （S）
In addition, the profit deducted a total cost from gross earnings.
SL−C （S）＝I
Because of SL＝R （S） or L （S） S
R （S）−C （S）＝I
Thus, it is provided when the maximization condition of I differentiates the above about S.
 dI   
＝
  dR  
−




 dS dS dS
Thus, it transcribes dR/dS into marginal revenue MR, dC/dS into marginal cost MC, the 
expression becomes MR-MC = 0 （2-1） and gets follows.
MR＝MC （2−2）
In addition, a marginal cost is quantity of the loyalty that is necessary to let a supply of 
the international public goods rise 1 unit. In other words, if there are few supplies, the 
marginal cost grows big and shrinks if a supply is big （Scale Merit）. Therefore, a marginal 
cost curve is a supply curve. In other words. where the profit maximization condition of the 
hegemony country in the monopole system becomes the point （a point of intersection） that a 
marginal revenue curve and a marginal cost curve are equal. In addition, a method in search 
of a marginal revenue curve is to differentiate gross earnings function R = L （S） S about S.
 dR  
＝ L （S）  ＋
  dL  
・ S ＝ MR （2−3）
 dS dS
Here, it is dL/dS <0 and L （S） <0. Therefore, the above becomes the decrease function 
about S. By trade off relations of the S and L, it is recognized that it is a curve of the right 
inferiority.
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Figure 1 :  supply and demand relations of the international public goods in the Uni-polar 
system.
The vertical axis of figure 1 is loyalty degree L of the profit maximum that is necessary 
for the acquisition per 1 international public goods unit. The horizontal axle is supply S of the 
profit maximum. Demand curve DD, marginal cost curve MC, marginal revenue curve MR 
are drawn. The point where MR intersects MC is point A1 on DD （l1, s1）. This point is the 
supply that a hegemony country lets you maximize a profit. In addition, this point expresses 
the loyalty degree that a hegemony country requests each country for （so-called “Cournot’s 
Point”）. The above is composition of the monopoly market which we can look at with a 
standard economic text well.
When marginal cost curve MC1 shifts to MC2 （increase） or MC3 （decrease） here, point 
A1 mentioned above moves to A2 or A3 each. In addition, in s1, l1 changes to it to l2 or l3 to s2 
or s3, too. The loyalty degrees increase in the former, and the supplies decrease. This 
increases the profit of the supply country and, however, it becomes disadvantageous to the 
demand country and increase the dissatisfaction. In addition, in the case of the latter, the 
loyalty degrees decrease, and, however, the supplies increase. This increases the profit of the 
demand country adversely and, however, it becomes disadvantageous to the supply country 
and increase the dissatisfaction. In other words, it is with an element increasing the 
dissatisfaction of the supply and demand two countries, and both increase and decrease of 
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MC want to do it and invite the destabilization of the system. Therefore, the Uni-polar 
system is the international system that is more unstable than Bi-polar system （cf. following 
chapter）.
In addition, it transforms the （2-3） expression mentioned above at the following.
MR ＝ L （ 1  ＋ 
  dL  
・
  S  
）
 dS L
And, it transforms the （2-3） expression mentioned above at the following. Then, it 
substitutes e = -dS/dL / S/L as flexibility of the loyalty degree as above and assume it MR = 
L （1-1/e）. Furthermore, it is as follows when it substitutes MR = MC and arrange it about 1/e.
 1  
＝ L −
  MC 　　　　 　
（2−4）
 e L
It means that international system rule degrees of the hegemony country increase so 
that this value is big （reciprocal number = of the price elasticity of demand so-called “Lerner’
s Degree of Monopoly”）.
In addition, as for the supply activity of the international public goods, Initial Cost is 
serious, and and it is very likely that Sunk Cost grows big and wants to do it, and an entry 
wall is high, and, in the reason, global community, it is easy to be in the Natural Monopoly = 
hegemony system. But it is very likely that the loyalty degree called for is maintained to 
suitable quantity, and this is so-called Contestability if it is relaxed a situation by diplomatic 
relations or the world opinion of the hegemon. In addition, even if the burden puts pressure 
on profit, It may continue the supply of the international public goods by the hegemon in the 
Uni-polar system in the real international relations, this is rigorousness by so-called “Concord 
Effect.”8）  Because the reason why it stop supply of the international public goods is that a 
hegemon will accept “failure” formally and Logic of Politics beyond Logic of Economy is 
strong as a policy decision element and acts there （possibility of the activity that is Non-
Rational or Non-Marketable）.
3. A Dynamics and the stability of the Bi-polar system.
The Bi-polar system is unification of the international relations by two superpowers, and, 
in other words, it is the Cold War System. Here, two superpowers supply international public 
goods. In addition, it is supplied international public goods by one superpower, and the 
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demand country gives a superpower the support in the foreign policy instead and shows 
loyalty. Therefore, two superpowers supply international public goods until a loyalty degree 
of the demand country becomes biggest, and and it is with the degree of the loyalty that the 
point where it agrees with the demand for other countries is most suitable （it is a balance 
level in “the Duopoly Market” if it says by a term of the Microeconomics）. In other words, in 
the case of an uncooperative game, it is the argument of the bipolar system of neo-realism or 
Structural Realism by words of the international political theory （e.g., Kenneth N. Waltz）. In 
addition, in the case of a cooperative cooperative game, it is the argument of International 
Cooperation of Neo-Liberalism or Neo-Liberal Institutionalism （e.g., Robert O. Keohane）.9） 
Needless to say, this thesis discusses analogy with the former because it assumes non-
cooperative games here.
（1） The formulation by the mathematics model
It formulates the above-mentioned argument to expect accuracy. Here, it takes the Cold 
War System = duopoly that is an uncooperative system into consideration and theorize it. At 
first, let us assume it, the market demand curve D = B-A （S1+S2）, expense curve C = AS1 of 
Country A, expense curve C = BS2 of Country B, the market. Therefore, it could be write the 
profit of the two countries as follows.
Profit of the country A：I1＝（B−A（S1＋S2）） S1−AS1
Profit of the country B：I2＝（B−A（S1＋S2）） S2−AS2
But as for the balance analysis that S1 and S2 are the fixed number of each expression 
here, because this does not add the element of the strategy to is because is it.
 dS1  ＝0
 dS2
 dS2  ＝0
 dS1
But as for the balance analysis that S1 and S2 are the fixed number of each expression 
here, because this does not add the element of the strategy to is because is it. In other words, 
Country A supposes Country B not to increase a supply, and Country B supposes that 
Country A does not increase it （so-called “Cournot’s Assumption”）. Therefore, the 
maximization condition differentiates I1 in S1 and is provided by differentiating I2 in S2.
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 dl1  ＝ （B−A） − A  （ 2S1＋S2 ）  ＝ 0  （3−1）
 dS1　
 dl2  ＝ （B−A） − A  （ S1＋2S2 ）  ＝ 0  （3−2）
 dS2 
When it pays off above （3-1） and （3-2） and find a reaction function, it is as follows. This 
is a maximization condition of the each Country A and Country B.
2S1 ＋ S2＝




 B  
−1
 A
Then, it deciphers the simultaneous equation mentioned above.
S1 ＝ 
 1   
（ 




 1   
（ 
 B  
−1 ） （3−4）
 3 A
It is as follows when it substitutes the above for L = B-A （S1+S2）.
L＝B−A （
 1  
（
 B  
− 1） ＋ 1 （ 
 B  
− 
 1  
））
 3 A A 3
 ＝B−
  3  
A （B−A） （3−5）
 2
This （3-3） （3-4） （3-5） is a balance condition （so-called Cournot Solution）. In other words, 
it is the profit maximization condition of the superpower in the international relations of the 
Bi-polar system type like the hegemon in the Uni-polar system, and it is with a point （point of 
intersection） where after all marginal revenue （curve） and a marginal cost （curve） agree.
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Figure2 :  Supply and Demand Relation of the International Public Goods in the Bi-polar 
System.
Figure 2 is loyalty degree L of the profit maximum that a vertical axis is necessary for 
the acquisition per 1 international public goods unit, and a cross axle is supply S of the 
international public goods again. Demand curve dd where Country B is no reaction for the 
change of the loyalty degree that Country A calls for, Demand curve DD where Country B 
reacts to for the change of the loyalty degree that Country A calls for, Marginal cost curve 
MC, marginal revenue curve MR are written. This is composition of the familiar oligopolistic 
market with a text of standard microeconomics like figure 1.
Demand curve dd of the left side of the A point shows that other superpower do not 
follow a loyalty degree request of a certain superpower. Demand curve DD of the right side 
of the A point shows that other superpower follow a loyalty degree request of a certain 
superpower. The reaction of the demand is big in the left side （a degree of leaning is small） 
and is small again on the right side （a degree of leaning is big）.
This refraction demand curve expresses that differential calculus is impossible in point A 
（l1, s1） deciding L and S. Therefore, the derived function is discontinuous because differential 
coefficients are different. In addition, it is marginal revenue curve MR （MRd of the figure 
and MRD） = L+dL/dS / S. It is maintained in the equivalent L and S as far as marginal cost 
curve MC goes along this discontinuous part and becomes like stiffening. In other words, 
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demand curve is refracted here. In addition, the marginal revenue curve MR is discontinuous. 
Therefore, both loyalty degrees that is necessary for a supply of the international public 
goods and the acquisition are maintained as the present conditions.
Even if MC1 curve changes to MC2 （increase） or MC3 （decrease） if it says in detail, 
stiffening becomes like L1 and S1 without influence together because there is refraction 
demand curve. Therefore, quantity of the dissatisfaction for the system does not have the 
change and stabilizes both of both supply and demand international public goods. In this 
respect, it is thought that the Bi-polar system is an international system having stability more 
comparative than the Uni-polar system mentioned above.
In addition, after all a burden on the activity has rigorousness than the case of the Uni-
polar system for a certain period of time after having been in a condition to put considerable 
pressure on the profit that the two countries acquire virtually, and, in the real international 
relations, as for the supply of the international public goods by two superpowers in the Bi-
polar system, it is thought that they tend to continue it at the risk of a loss. The reason is 
because it means “the defeat” for the rival country by supply of the international public goods 
one country stop or to decrease, and it is with the policy decision element which is more 
important “the logic of the politics” beyond “the logic of the economy” than the case of the 
Uni-polar system crucially here.10）
４．Conclusion
This report examined on a balance condition for an international system of Uni-polar and 
Bi-polar to stabilize it based on the recognition that was the element that smooth supply of 
the international public goods stabilized international relations.
First, in the Uni-polar system, It lectured on the stabilization condition of the system 
which a single hegemon supplied international public goods, and acquired the loyalty of the 
countries. Second, in the Bi-polar system, It discussed the stabilization condition of the system 
which two superpowers supplied international public goods, and got the loyalty of the 
countries. Finally, It schematized the above-mentioned model and comparative analysed them. 
There is refraction demand curve in Bi-polar system; that is why a loyalty degree and the 
rigorousness of the supply exist.  Therefore, supply of the international public goods may be 
carried out relatively than a monopole system stably.
In addition, the problem of this report is following two. First, it is to make the 
interlocking movement-related logic of monopole system and the sokyoku system dynamics. 
In other words, it is to get the argument about the process of the decline of the hegemony 
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country and the prosperity of the challenge country ready. Second, it is to formulate supply 
and demand relations of the international public goods in the cooperative game, and, in other 
words, it is to formulate the logic of the principle of neo-liberalism or principle of neo-liberal 
system = international coordination using a similar concept. Such an argument will formulate 
an argument of so-called Neo-Realism Synthesis closely.11）
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